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Abstract
In this paper we examine the formal implications of international
risk sharing among a set of countries in the presence of market fric-
tions and forward-looking behaviour. We show that if frictions pre-
vent consumption to adjust instantaneously to its optimal long run
level, consumption streams in the countries belonging to the risk
sharing pool change over time according to a dynamic disequilib-
rium model which can be nested within an error-correcting vector
autoregressive process. Econometric methods for testing the restric-
tions imposed by the theory at both short and long horizons are pro-
posed and discussed. The empirical analysis of a set of core Euro-
pean countries suggest that consumption data do not seem to contrast
neither with the existence of risk sharing against permanent income
fluctuations and integrated capital markets, nor with a gradual and in-
terrelated process of adjustment towards the equilibrium. The appar-
ent lack of risk sharing in Europe documented in earlier works might
depend not only on the misspecification of the short run dynamics
of consumption, but also on the relatively low speed of adjustment
toward the equilibrium.
Keywords: Adjustment costs, Consumption risk sharing, Coin-
tegrated VARmodels, Financial market integration, Market frictions.
J.E.L. Classification: C32, E21.
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1 Introduction
Common wisdom contends that under complete markets changes to coun-
try per capita consumption should be related to changes in the consumption
streams of the partner countries in the risk sharing pool or to changes in
aggregate (world) per capita consumption only. Conventional risk sharing
tests and/or techniques aimed to measure the different channels of con-
sumption insurance are based on this requirement, see e.g. Asdrubali et
al. (1996), Asdrubali and Kim (2004) and references therein. However,
several empirical tests have shown substantial departures from this propo-
sition, the so-called ‘full risk sharing hypothesis’ (FRS), both on individual
and aggregated data, Lewis (1999).
Standard risk sharing tests are usually based on the idea that changes
to individual consumptions, once corrected for changes in aggregate con-
sumption or consumption of the ‘leader country’, and possibly for real
exchange rates, are not predictable on the basis of the available informa-
tion set, see e.g. Canova and Ravn (1996). These implications arise from
the well known condition that under complete markets the ex-post nomi-
nal marginal rate of substitution equalize across countries. However, the
empirical evidence based on consumption data and power utility functions
suggests that risks are poorly shared internationally. Also the correlations
between the ratio of domestic to foreign consumption and real exchange
rates appear sharply below one or even negative, as found in Backus and
Smith (1993), Kollmann (1995) and Ravn (2001).
The most recurrent explanations for the observed ‘consumption correla-
tions puzzle’ in the international business cycle literature hinges on the idea
that some components of utility are not separable and internationally trade-
able such as leisure (Backus et al., 1992) and nontradeable goods (Backus
and Smith, 1993, Stockman and Tesar, 1995)1. However, as argued (and
shown empirically) by Lewis (1999), risk sharing tests that simply cor-
rect for the presence of nontradeables do not seem to be sufficient alone
1These explanations of the lack of international risk sharing can be potentially reconciled
with the “equity home bias” puzzle, see e.g. Lewis (1999). The fact that “consumption
home bias” is somehow related to “equity home bias” can be understood, intuitively, by
observing that countries that bias their equity holdings away from foreign assets will not
diversify all of their home output risk .
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to explain the lack of consumption risk sharing. A further explanation is
that international financial markets are not developed enough, i.e. markets
incompleteness, see e.g. Kollmann (1996). Also within this perspective,
however, theory offers convincing arguments to doubt that incomplete asset
markets alone can account for the observed low international consumption
correlations. Recently, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) provide a unified expla-
nation of the major puzzles of international macroeconomics, including the
violation of FRS and purchasing power parity (PPP), in terms of costs in
goods markets (transport costs, tariffs, nontariff barriers) that impede trade,
see also Ravn and Mazzega (2004) and Brandt et al. (2005).
Although full risk sharing requires frictionless markets, in practice indi-
viduals face the (dis)utility costs implied by restrictions on factory mobility
as well as on trade in international goods markets. For instance, if there is a
positive shock in one country, asset holdings by the other countries should
in principle lead to an outflow of goods; if on the one hand, restrains in cap-
ital markets can be considered negligible, it can be costly in goods markets
to ship goods and these costs might increase with the volume being shipped.
Nevertheless, if these frictions and the related costs are not large enough to
keep consumers far from the ‘frictionless’ first order conditions, the ex-
post nominal marginal rate of substitution will not equalize instantaneously
across countries but after a gradual process of adjustment. Consequently
departures from the FRS hypothesis may depend on the lack of dynamic
structure characterizing the models which are traditionally implemented to
test the FRS hypothesis. Starting from these observations in this paper we
show that amending standard intertemporal risk sharing models with sim-
ple exogenous costs which impede instantaneous adjustment to the optimal
risk sharing position entails a dynamic structure for countries consumption
changes that is not accounted in the traditional empirical analyses. Omit-
ting such dynamics flaws standard measures of the extent of risk sharing.
Since market frictions are difficult to quantify, our model describes tem-
porary deviations from the FRS hypothesis without being specific about the
nature of the rigidities. We sketch a dynamic disequilibrium model where
representative agents in each countries are forward-looking and attempt to
minimize intertemporally the costs of being away from the ‘frictionless’
first order conditions. The model we formalize hinges on the idea that coun-
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tries attempt to minimize the costs of deviations from FRS. Specifically,
the model has the following features and (testable) implications. First, con-
sumption changes of a given country other than depending on contempo-
raneous consumption changes of the partners, display an error-correcting
structure involving lagged deviations from the optimal risk sharing posi-
tion of (potentially) all countries in the risk sharing pool. Thus the model
predicts that adjustment is interrelated across countries, i.e. shocks affect-
ing one country in the risk sharing pool produce adjustment in the other
countries. This mechanism of interrelated adjustment reflects the idea that
countries in the risk sharing pool aim in the long run at the maximization of
collective utility. Second, as agents are forward-looking in an environment
characterized by impediments to trade and factor (especially labour) mo-
bility, beliefs on the evolution of expected future consumption changes of
the leader country and of real exchange rates of all countries affect the risk
sharing allocation. Third, consistently with recent findings (see Bacchioc-
chi and Fanelli, 2005, and references therein), our model do not require
that PPP holds among the countries in the risk sharing pool; this feature
contrasts with the large majority of papers on international risk sharing
tests where PPP is assumed to hold and the FRS proposition tends to be
rejected. As a result, correcting the tests of the FRS hypothesis for the
dynamics implied by costs of adjustment and expectations on future mar-
ket developments helps to explain why according to traditional analyses –
where a dynamic structure is omitted - international risks are poorly shared.
We set out maximum likelihood (ML) and regression-based procedures
for the model which allows to assess the existence of international risk shar-
ing as an equilibrium relation and to analyze the dynamic adjustment of
consumption towards optimal levels. The proposed framework provides an
alternative way, compared to e.g. Obstfeld (1989, 1994), Kollmann (1995),
Canova and Ravn (1996) and Ravn (2001), to tackle the empirical analysis
of risk sharing and assess the degree of integration in international capital
markets.
The dynamic risk sharing model is applied to a set of ‘core’ European
countries that joined the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. Eco-
nomic intuition suggests that countries with closer economic ties, as the
ones we consider in the paper, might have more efficient risk sharing mech-
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anisms at work; in fact, by using data over a forty year period, our results
suggest that if preference parameters are allowed to vary across countries
European consumption data do not seem to contrast with the existence of
risk sharing as a long run phenomenon. Moreover a gradual and inter-
related dynamic process of adjustment towards the equilibrium is detected.
These results contrast with the findings in e.g. Canova and Ravn (1996) and
Sørensen and Yosha (1998), obtained through different estimation methods
and overlooking the role of dynamic adjustment.
The plan of the paper is the following. Section 2 introduces the stan-
dard international consumption risk sharing model and discusses its main
implications. Section 3 provides a dynamic extension under the assumption
of frictions that prevent instantaneous adjustment to optimal risk sharing.
Section 4 discusses estimation issues and in Section 5 the proposed risk
sharing model is applied to investigate the extent of risk sharing among
a set of ‘core’ European countries which joined the European Monetary
Union in 1999. Some final remarks may be found in Section 6.
2 Model and implications
As in Canova and Ravn (1996) and Kolmann (1995) we consider a stan-
dard international business cycle model. It is assumed that a world of N
countries (indexed by i = 1, ..., N ) exists, each country being inhabited
by a infinitely lived representative agent. His/her expected lifetime utility
is given by V i = Et
(∑∞
t=0(ρ
i)tU i
(
Cit , b
i
t
))
, where Cit denotes the i-th
country consumption good at time t, while bit > 0 represents a country-
specific stochastic taste shock; ρi (0 < ρi < 1) denotes country i-th dis-
count factor. Note that the goods consumed by the different countries are
allowed to differ. As usual, Et (·) denotes expectations conditional on all
information available up to time t, Ωt. As is standard in the literature,
we further assume that the utility function U i (x1, x2) of country i-th rep-
resentative agent is an isoelastic instantaneous period utility function, i.e.
U i (x1, x2) = x2
(
1/σi
)
xσ
i
1 (σ
i < 1), where 1−σi is a CRRA coefficient.
Without loss of generality we suppose that the N -th country of the risk
sharing pool can be considered as the leader of the arrangement; we denote
this country with the superscript ‘0’. Within this set-up the allocation which
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maximize the expected average utility of consumption (under standard bud-
get constraints), gives rise, for each pair of countries i, j = 1, ..., N to the
relation
(ρi)tU ic P
i
t = (ρ
j)tU jc P
j
t e
i/j
t (1)
where for a generic country h, Uhc is the marginal utility of consumption,
P ht is the price level of the country and e
i/j
t is the nominal exchange rate
between the currencies of country i and j; the equilibrium condition (1)
simply establishes that nominal rates of substitution are equalized across
countries under FRS.
From (1) it follows that the optimal consumption streams, relative to the
leader country’s consumption, are restricted as follows (Kollmann, 1995;
Ravn, 2001)
c∗it = θ
ic0t + δ
ir
i/0
t + φ
it+ ηit, all t and i = 1, ..., N − 1 (2)
where c∗it is the optimal level of (logged) consumption in country i, c0t is
the (logged) consumption in the leader country, θi = (1−σ0)(1−σi)−1 is
leader country CRRA coefficient relative to country i-th CRRA coefficient,
δi = (1 − σi)−1 corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
of country i, φi = log
(
ρ0/ρi
)
/
(
σi − 1), ri/0t = log(ei/0t ) + log(P 0t ) −
log(P it ) is the (logged) price of one unit of the leader country’s consump-
tion good in terms of country i’s consumption good, i.e. the logged bilateral
real exchange rate between country i and the leader country2. Finally, ηit in
(2) depends on the stochastic terms which enter the utility functions of the
countries i and 0, i.e. the x2 variable in U i (x1, x2); these terms may repre-
sent preference shocks, factors which are beyond the control of agents, or
variables which interact non-separably with consumption but which have
not explicitly modelled, e.g. hours worked/leisure, government spending,
real money balances and so on. Throughout it will be assumed, except
where indicated, that ηit embodies the preference shocks of the countries i
and 0 (Kollmann, 1995).
The model has strong implications on the optimal level of consumption
that each country should achieve, although large part of the literature de-
2The formal derivation of (2) can be directly obtained from Kollmann (1995) and it is
therefore omitted for brevity. A full proof is available from the authors upon request.
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votes attention to the growth rate version of (2) ignoring the information
in the levels. If the terms ηit, i = 1, ..., N − 1, are stationary and if con-
sumption can be well represented by means of integrated processes of order
one, I(1) hereafter, then equation (2) can be seen as a cointegrating relation
involving the optimal consumption level, the leader country consumption
level and the real exchange rate. Therefore net of the preference shock, ηit,
the linear combination
(
1 , − θi , − δi , − φi)

cit
c0t
r
i/0
t
t
 = cit − θic0t − δiri/0t − φit (3)
must be stationary, see also Backus and Smith (1993), Kollmann (1995) and
Apte et al. (2004). Furthermore, if the real exchange rate is stationary (that
is, PPP holds in the long run), then the equilibrium relation involves country
i-th optimal consumption level and the leader country optimal consumption
and can be analyzed and estimated as a cointegration relation between cit
and c0t .
Empirical tests based on consumption levels are usually carried out by
assuming that cit equalize the corresponding optimal levels c
i∗
t , described
thorough the FRS proposition (2)3. For instance, both both Kollmann (1995)
and Ravn (2001) assume that adjustment is instantaneous, i.e. cit = c
i∗
t ,
all i, implying therefore that (cit − ci∗t ) is unpredictable given information
available at time t, which further requires preference shock, ηit to be un-
predictable given past information. On the other hand, Canova and Ravn
(1996) employ, among others, nonparametric tests for cointegration among
the consumption of pairs of G7 countries, hence setting δi to 0 in (2) and
finding little support of the FRS proposition.4
3The proposition that relative consumptions and real exchange rates should be positively
(and higly) correlated under FRS can be derived directly from (2) under the assumption that
the i-th and the leader country have the same risk aversion coefficients and intertemporal
discount rates. Indeed, with θi = 1 and φi = 0 and ignoring ηit it follows that cit − c0t =
δiex
i/0
t , where δ
i > 0.
4Implicitly, setting δi = 0 is equivalent to assume that the real exchange rate is station-
ary; i.e., that PPP holds in the long run. This condition is not needed in the following.
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3 Dynamic adjustment
In this section we derive a dynamic disequilibrium model which formalizes
the process of adjustment toward optimal risk sharing. In what follows it
is convenient to adopt the following matrix notation. Let ct = (c1t , ...,
cN−1t )′ be the (N − 1) × 1 vector containing per capita consumption of
the N countries except the N -th, i.e. that of leader one, and let c∗t be the
vector containing the corresponding equilibrium quantities given by (2).
Finally, let wt be the N × 1 vector defined as wt = (c0t , r1/0t , r2/0t , ...,
r
N−1/0
t )
′, where c0t ≡ cNt and rj/0t is defined as above. In the light of the
FRS equilibrium relation (2) and its empirical counterpart (3), the vector
of deviations of actual per capita consumption from optimal consumption,
ct − c∗t , can be written as
ct − c∗t = ct −Υwt − φt− ηt (4)
where Υ is a (N − 1) × N matrix depending on the preference param-
eters θi and δi, i = 1, .., N − 1. Specifically, Υ = (θ ...diag (δ)), θ =(
θ1, ..., θN−1
)′, δ = (δ1, ..., δN−1)′, φ = (φ1, ..., φN−1)′ and ηt = (η1t , ...,
ηN−1t )′. For instance, withN = 3, ct = (c1t , c2t )′, c0t ≡ c3t is the consump-
tion stream of the leader country,wt = (c0t , r
1/0
t , r
2/0
t )
′ and the matrixΥ
and the vector φ take the form:
Υ =
[
θ1 δ1 0
θ2 0 δ2
]
, φ =
[
φ1
φ2
]
. (5)
If the adjustment of ct to c∗t would be instantaneous, the vector ut =
ct−c∗t should be unpredictable given information available at time t, mean-
ing that countries benefit the ‘frictionless’ first order conditions (1) with-
out utility losses. On the other hand, if market imperfections impede the
instantaneous adjustment but are not large enough to generate permanent
deviations from (1), one would expects ut to be a persistent, though mean-
reverting, process.
Assume that at each point in time being away from the equilibrium
and varying consumption to achieve it is costly and that costs can be also
generated by deviations from FRS of the other countries comprising the
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risk sharing agreement. A convenient way to describe the above mentioned
disequilibrium dynamic mechanism is to posit that the representative agent
of country i faces the following intertemporal optimization problem:
min
{cit+h}
Et
∞∑
h=0
(ρi)h[ψ1,ii(cit+h − c∗it+h)2
+j 6=i ψ1,ij(cit+h − c∗it+h)(cjt+h − c∗jt+h)
+ ψ2,ii(cit+h − cit+h−1)2] (6)
where ψ1,ij , ψ2,ii, i, j = 1, ..., N −1 are (positive) adjustment parameters.
There are two types of costs embedded in the present value cost function
minimized in (6): the terms in the first line measure respectively the cost
for country i of being away from its own FRS consumption level (ψ1,ii) and
the costs implied by deviations from FRS of the other countries (provided
ψ1,ji 6= 0); the term in the second line measures the cost (ψ2,ii) for country
i of changing consumption levels to restore equilibrium.5
It can be shown that considering the problem (6) for all i = 1, ..., N−1
countries in the risk sharing pool corresponds to solve the problem
min
{ct+h}
Et
∞∑
h=0
ρh[(ct+h − c∗t+h)′Ψ1(ct+h − c∗t+h) (7)
+ (ct+h − ct+h−1)′Ψ2(ct+h − ct+h−1)]
where ρh is a matrix defined as ρh = diag((ρ1)h, ..., (ρN−1)h), Ψ1 =
[ψ1,ij ] is a (N − 1) × (N − 1) symmetric positive definite matrix, and
Ψ2 = diag(ψ2,11 , ...., ψ2,(N−1)(N−1)). Assuming for simplicity that in
this second stage countries discount future costs at the same (average) rate,
ρ, then ρh = ρIN−1 and the solution to (7) can be computed by using
5Actually agents might face also the costs of adjusting the speed with which changes
in consumption streams are put into effect; a third cost term of the form ψ3,ii(∆cit+h −
∆cit+h−1)
2 could be thus included in (6), see e.g. Binder and Pesaran (1995) and Fanelli
(2005). Observe that quadratic costs of adjustment are here solely used for mathematical
convenience; in principle, there is no reason or motivation to argue that positive and negative
deviations from optimal risk sharing have the same effect on the process of adjustment.
Thus the cost function in (6) has to be regarded as a mere approximation of the “true”
adjustment process.
9
techniques as in Hansen and Sargent (1981) and Binder and Pesaran (1995).
The first-order conditions read as the system of Euler equations
∆ct = ρEt∆ct+1 −Ψ(ct − c∗t ) (8)
where ∆ct = ct − ct−1 andΨ = Ψ−12 Ψ1. The elements of theΨ matrix,
which is neither diagonal if ψ1,ji 6= 0, nor symmetric, measure the relative
importance of disequilibrium, adjustment and cross-adjustment costs. The
i-th equation of (8) (i.e. that relative to country i) is then given by
∆cit = ρEt∆c
i
t+1 − ψ′i(ct −Υwt − φt) + η˜it (9)
where η˜it is the i-th element of η˜t, η˜t = Ψηt, and ψ
′
i is the i-th row of Ψ;
observe that
ψ′i(ct −Υwt − φt) = ψii(cit − θic0t − δiri/0t − φit)
+
N−1∑
j=1,j 6=i
ψij(c
j
t − θjc0t − δjrj/0t − φjt) + η˜it
where ψii is the i-th element on the principal diagonal of Ψ and the ψij ,
for i 6= j, are the corresponding off-diagonal elements; unless ψij = 0
(i.e. Ψ is diagonal), consumption changes in country i depend not only on
their own future expected changes but also on the extent of the deviation
of country i and (potentially) all the other countries from the optimal risk
sharing position. Within this set-up if ψij 6= 0, and a given country faces
temporary departures from its equilibrium, all the other countries in the risk
sharing pool experience next-time period consumption variations.
The system of Euler equations (9) apparently hides the role of the vari-
ables in wt, i.e. the consumption stream of the leader country and real
exchange rates. Upon imposing a proper transversality condition the level
version of (8) can be solved forward (Binder and Pesaran, 1995) as:
ct = Kct−1 +
∞∑
h=0
(ρK)h(I(N−1) − ρK)(I(N−1) −K)Etc∗t+h (10)
where K is a (N − 1) × (N − 1) matrix with stable eigenvalues obtained
as the (unique) solution to the second-order matrix equation
ρK2 − [(1 + ρ)I(N−1) +Ψ]K+ IN = 0(N−1),(N−1).
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The representation (10) highlights that for country j consumption at time t
is a weighted average of consumption at time t−1 of all countries in the risk
sharing pool and expected future values of optimal consumption which in
turn depends on the variables in wt, with weights declining geometrically
over time.
By using the equality
∑∞
h=0 (ρK)
h (I(N−1) − ρK) =∑∞h=0 (ρK)h −∑∞
h=0 (ρK)
h+1, adding (−ct−1) to both sides and ±
(
I(N−1) −K
)
Υwt
to the right hand side, after rearranging terms and assuming that thatEtηt+h =
0 for h = 1, 2, ..., the model can be reparameterized in the error-correcting
format
∆ct = (K− I(N−1))[ct−1 −Υwt−1 − φt]
+
∞∑
h=0
(ρK)h(I(N−1) −K)ΥEt∆wt+h + a+ vt (11)
where vt = (IN −K)ηt and a = (ρK)(I(N−1) − ρK)−1φ is a constant.
The model (11) shows that the dynamics of consumption of the countries
in the risk sharing pool depends on past deviations from the optimal risk
sharing position (of potentially all countries), and future expected changes
of the bilateral real exchange rates and growth consumption of the reference
(leader) country. The (K − I(N−1)) matrix in (11) plays a role similar to
that of the adjustment matrix Ψ in the system (9); indeed, the elements
of K are function of Ψ and, in general, if Ψ is non-diagonal, K will be
non-diagonal too.
3.1 Implications under VAR dynamics
Under precise conditions the model (11) can be solved for future expected
values of∆wt. Assume, for example, that the process generating∆wt can
be described as a stable VAR(p − 1) (for simplicity and without loss of
generality we omit deterministic terms), which written in companion form
reads as
∆w˜t = Φ∆w˜t−1 + u˜t (12)
where∆w˜t = (∆w′t,∆w′t−1 , ...,∆w′t−p+2)′ and u˜t = (u′t , 0′)′ are g×1
(g = N(p − 1)), ut ∼ WN(0,Σuu) with covariance matrix Σuu positive
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definite and the matrix Φ is defined as
Φ
g×g=

Φ1 Φ2 · · · Φp−1
IN 0 · · · 0
...
. . . · · · ...
0 · · · IN 0
 (13)
and has eigenvalues inside the unit circle in the complex plane. LetHw de-
note a selection matrix such thatHw∆w˜t = ∆wt; then from (12) and after
conditioning with respect to the ‘smaller’ information set Ft = {ct, wt,
ct−1, wt−1, ....} and applying the law of iterated expectation, the quan-
tity Et∆wt+h can be computed as Et∆wt+h = HwE(∆w˜t+h | Ft) =
HwΦh∆w˜t. By substituting into (11), after some algebra the model sim-
plifies in the expression
∆ct = (K− I(N−1))[ct−1 −Υwt−1 − φt]
+ Γ0∆wt + Γ1∆wt−1 + ...+ Γp−2∆wt−p+2 + a+ vt(14)
where the (N − 1) × g matrix of parameters Γ =[Γ0 , Γ1 , ... , Γp−2 ] is
subject to the cross-equation restrictions6
vec(Γ) = [I(N−1)g −Φ⊗ (ρK)]−1[H′w⊗(IN−1 −K)]vec(Υ) (15)
and it has been assumed that E(vt | Ft) = vt.
The i-th equation of (14) (i.e. that relative to country i) reads as
∆cit = (kii − 1)(cit−1 − θic0t−1 − δiri/0t−1 − φit)
+
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
kij(c
j
t−1 − θjc0t−1 − δjrj/0t−1 − φjt)
+γ0,ic∆c0t + γ0,ii∆r
i/0
t +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
γ0,ij∆r
j/0
t
+γ1,ic∆c0t−1 + γ1,ii∆r
i/0
t−1 +
N∑
j=1,j 6=i
γ1,ij∆r
j/0
t−1 + v
i
t (16)
6A formal proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
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where (γ0,ic, γ0,i1, ....., γ0,iN ) are the (opportunely restricted) parameters of
the i-th row of Γ0, (γ1,ic, γ1,i1, ....., γ1,iN ) are the (opportunely restricted)
parameters of the i-th row ofΓ1, (kii−1) is the i-th element on the principal
diagonal of (K − I(N−1)), kij (j 6= i) are the corresponding off-diagonal
elements and vit corresponds to the i-th elements of vt. This equation shows
that consumption changes in country i not only depend on contemporane-
ous changes of consumption of the leader country and of the real exchange
rate of all countries in the risk sharing pool and possibly their lags, but also
on past deviations from the optimal risk sharing levels in country i as well
as in all the other countries (provided kij 6= 0, i 6= j, i.e. K non-diagonal).
Moreover, in general the number of lags in (16) depends on the lags char-
acterizing the process (12)-(13) for ∆wt.
The error-correcting dynamic structure of the system (14) and its equa-
tions (16) also allow to explain the failure of conventional risk sharing tests.
By referring to the differenced version of (2), risk sharing tests are typi-
cally aimed at establishing the orthogonality of∆cjt , corrected for∆c
0
t and
∆rj/0t , to the information set Ft; the equation (16) suggests that if con-
sumers compute and update expectations through a dynamic model similar
to (12), then∆cjt must be orthogonal with respect to the information set Ft
only after correcting for ∆c0t , ∆r
1/0
t , ..., ∆r
j/0
t , ..., ∆r
N/0
t , ∆c
0
t−1, ∆r
1/0
t−1,
..., ∆rj/0t−1, ... and all the elements in (ct−1 −Υwt−1).
3.2 Further implications
The system (14) has been derived under precise assumptions on the pro-
cess used by agents to compute expectations on exchange rates changes
and on the growth rate of consumption of the leader country. It is indeed
assumed that the data generating process for ∆wt belongs to the class of
VAR processes (12). Abstracting from the fact that the exogeneity restric-
tions implied by (12) can be easily tested (see Section 4), the hypothesis that
expectations on the short term fluctuations of exchange rates are not driven
by future developments in ‘fundamentals’ may be viewed as restrictive, see
e.g. Engel and West (2005).
When the process (12) is misspecified because of feedbacks from ∆ct
to ∆wt, the system (14)-(15) can be no more intended as the approximate
13
solution to the proposed risk sharing model. An alternative approach can be
pursued to derive testable implications of the model without being specific
about the expectations generating system; along the lines of Engsted and
Haldrup (1994) the idea is to interpret the system (11) as a special case of
a present value (PV) model and apply suitable econometric techniques.
Let et = ct −Υwt − φ(t + 1) be the (N − 1) × 1 vector containing
deviations of actual consumption from the optimal risk sharing position,
and define the (stationary) linear combination
St = et −Ket−1 +KΥ∆wt.
By simply extending Engsted and Haldrup (1994) to the case of multiple
decision variables, standard algebraic manipulations of the model (11) im-
ply that the stationary ‘spread’
ξt = St − (ρK)−1St−1 + (I(N−1) −K)Υ∆wt (17)
must be unpredictable given information available at time t− 2. This prop-
erty of ξt is derived under the assumption that the disturbance term vt in
(11) is such that E(vt | Ft) = vt, that means that vt belongs to the infor-
mation set at time t; on the contrary, if it is assumed that vt = 0 then it can
be proved that the spread in (17) is unpredictable given information dated
t− 1 and earlier.
As it will be detailed in Section 4.2, the property of the spread with
respect to the observable information may be used to set out a test of the
dynamic risk sharing models in the situations where consumption changes
and relative consumption help to predict real exchange rates and to estimate
the parameters of interest.
4 Estimation and testing
The cointegration implications (3) of the risk sharing model introduced in
the present paper have been already discussed in Section 2. Thus it will
assumed, except where explicitly indicated, that the preference parameters
in Υ and φ are known or fixed at their super-consistent estimates obtained
in a first stage by means of cointegration techniques (see below).
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GivenΥ and φ and after fixing the average discount factor ρ to an eco-
nomically plausible value, the empirical analysis of the dynamic risk shar-
ing model introduced in Section 3 requires the estimation of the structural
parameters K in (11) and a test of consistency with the data. To this pur-
pose we propose two approaches discussed respectively in Section 4.1 and
Section 4.2. In the first case we deal with the maximum likelihood (ML)
estimation of the dynamic risk sharing model (12)-(14), i.e. the model ob-
tained under the assumption agents compute expectations on the consump-
tion growth rate of the leader country and on the changes of real exchange
rates by assuming that ∆wt = (∆c0t , ∆r
1/0
t , ∆r
2/0
t , ..., ∆r
N−1/0
t )
′ is
strongly exogenous with respect toΥ (see Section 3.1). In the second case
we set out a regression-based method which hinges on the PV nature of
model (11) regardless the expectations generating system.
4.1 Maximum likelihood approach
Define the (2N − 1) × 1 vector yt = (c′t , w′t)′ and assume that the DGP
is generated by the I(1) cointegrated model (Johansen, 1996)
∆yt = αβ′yt−1+Π1∆yt−1+ ...+Πp−1∆yt−p+1+µ0+µ1t+ εt (18)
where α is the (2N−1)×r matrix of adjustment parameters, r the number
of cointegrating relations among the elements of yt, β is the (2N − 1) ×
(N−1)matrix containing the cointegrating vectors, Π˜i, i = 1, ..., p−1 are
(2N − 1)× (2N − 1) matrices, εt = (ε′ct , ε′wt)′ is a MDS with respect to
Ft with Gaussian distribution and covariance matrix partitioned as follows
Vε=
[
Vcc Vcw
Vwc Vww
]
.
Given yt = (c′t , w′t)′ and εt = (ε′ct , ε′wt)′, we can consider the corre-
sponding partitions of the parameters of the VECM:
α =
(
αc
αw
)
, µ0 =
(
µ0,c
µ0,w
)
, µ1 =
(
µ1,c
µ1,w
)
.
Πi =
[
Πc,i
Πw,i
]
=
[
Πcc,i Πcw,i
Πwc,i Πww,i
]
, i = 1, ..., p− 1
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which allows to express the partial system for ∆ct and the partial system
for ∆wt given the past information Ft−1 as
∆ct = αc(β′yt−1) +Πc,1∆wt−1 + ...+Πc,p−1∆wt−p+1 (19)
+µ0c + µ1ct+ εct
∆wt = αw(β′yt−1) +Πw,1∆wt−1 + ...+Πw,p−1∆wt−p+1 (20)
+µ0w + µ1wt+ εwt
As εt is Gaussian, the partial system for ∆ct conditioned with respect
to ∆wt and past information Ft−1 is then given by
∆ct = ω∆wt + δ(β′yt−1) + Π˜1∆wt−1 + ...+ Π˜p−1∆wt−p+1(21)
+µ˜0 + µ˜1t+ ε˜ct
where ω = VcwV−1ww, δ = αc − ωαw, Π˜i = Πc,i − ωΠw,,i, µ˜h = µh,c −
ωµh,w, h = 0, 1, and ε˜ct = εct − ωεwt (Johansen, 1996) with E(ε˜ctε′wt) =
0(N−1)×N by construction.
It can be now seen that the dynamic risk sharing model (12)-(14) repre-
sents a special case of (20)-(21). Indeed, the former can be obtained from
the latter under a precise set of restrictions on both the long run and short
run parameters.
As regards the long run, the vector et = ct −Υwt − φ (t+ 1) should
be stationary for the risk sharing model to hold (Section 2); therefore, the
number r of cointegrating relations involving yt should not be lower that
N − 1. Furthermore, by partitioning β of (18) as β = (βc , βw), it must
hold:
βc=
(
I
−Υ′
)
, µ1c = αcφ (22)
so that given δ =(δc , δw), the quantity δ(β′yt−1)+µ˜1t corresponds to δcet−1+
δwβ
′
wyt−1 in (21), where the second term cancels out when r = N − 1. It
is clear that a number of cointegrating relations lower than N − 1 implies
that in the long run consumption streams and real exchange rates do not
conform to (3)7.
7For the sake of simplicity we do not consider the case r > (N − 1).
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As regards the short run, once the cointegration rank is fixed to r =
N − 1 and β is fixed to (22) (in this case βw = 0, δw = 0), the structure
of dynamic adjustment implied by (12)-(14) is obtained if the following
exclusion (testable) restrictions on (21) and (20) hold jointly:
Π˜cc,i = 0 , i = 1, ..., p− 1 , Π˜cw,p−1 = 0 (23)
αw = 0 , Πwc,i = 0 , i = 1, ..., p− 1 , (24)
where Π˜i =
[
Π˜cc,i Π˜cw,i
]
. It can be easily recognized that the latter
constraints correspond to the strong exogeneity of ∆wt with respect to β.
Under (23)-(24) the dynamic risk sharing model is equivalent to the
unrestricted conditional VAR model (21) under the constraints
δ = K− I(N−1) , ω = Γ0 , Π˜cw,i = Γi , i = 1, ..., p− 2
and therefore constrained estimation provides the ML estimates of K, Γ0,
Γi , i = 1, ..., p − 2. Furthermore, for fixed values of β (Υ and φ) and of
the intertemporal discount factor ρ, a likelihood ratio (LR) or Wald test can
be carried out for the cross-equation rational expectations restrictions (15),
whereΦ is defined exactly as in (13) (withΦi = Πww,i , i = 1, ..., p− 1).
Summing up, the VEqCM (18) can be used to estimate the parameters
of the dynamic risk sharing model through standard likelihood methods. In
principle, the number of cointegrating relation could be determined by Jo-
hansen’s (1996) procedure. After the cointegration rank is determined, the
constraints on the cointegration space as well as those on the determinis-
tic drift terms as in (22) could be tested through standard LR or Wald-type
statistics. However, since the model involves both a time-series and spa-
tial dimension, it can be easily recognized that even with a relatively long
span of data, it is sufficient a small number of countries,N , to the make the
analysis based on yt = (c′t , w′t)′ cumbersome, due to the huge number of
parameters to be estimated.8
The estimation approach is sketched in the steps that follow:
8On the other hand, the approach proposed by Pesaran et al. (2004) for modelling re-
gional interdependencies through a “Global” VAR (GVAR) model, though appealing, is in
this case not carried out; indeed, by construction in Pesaran et al. (2004) each country-
specific VAR contains a set of foreign variables constructed as weighted averages of the
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1 Estimate the preference parameters Υ and φ of (4) by specifying, for
each country i = 1, ..., N − 1, VAR models of the form xt = (cit,
c0t , r
i/0
t )
′ (with a linear trend in the deterministic part) and investigat-
ing the number and structure of cointegration relations by following
Johansen’s (1996) procedure. This allows, for i = 1, ..., N − 1, to
recover super-consistent estimates of the preference parameters inΥ
and φ.
2 Given the (super-consistent) estimates of Υ and φ and having fixed β
and µ1c as in (22), estimate the VECM (18) (hence (21)-(20)) and
test the validity of the zero restrictions (23)-(24)9; if these are not
supported by the data reject the form (14)-(12) of the dynamic risk
sharing model, otherwise go to the step 3 below. Observe that the
rejection of (12)-(14) implies that the dynamic risk sharing model
obtained under the assumption of strong exogeneity of ∆wt is not
supported by the data; it could happen, in fact, that the more general
implications the implications described in Section 4.2
3 Estimate the system (21) subject to (23) and recover the ML estimates
of K, Γ0, Γi , i = 1, ..., p − 2. For fixed values of the intertempo-
ral discount factor ρ, check the validity of the rational expectations
constraints (15).
4.2 Present value test
As observed in Section 3.2, regardless the ‘true’ structure of the expecta-
tions generating feedbacks and the presence of feedbacks from ∆ct (and
et) to ∆wt, a general implication of the PV model (11) is that the spread
ξt = St − (ρK)−1St−1 + (I(N−1) −K)Υ∆wt (25)
country specific variables with weight given by trade shares (or similar weighting schemes),
whereas in our analysis each country-specific VAR involves per capita consumption of the
leader country (see below).
9Observe that as long as the number of countries involved is around N = 5 or N = 6,
the estimation of the stationary model (21)-(20) with cointegrating relations fixed is still
feasible if the number of time-series observations T , is sufficiently high, see the results that
follows.
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is unpredictable given the information available at time t− 2 if the distur-
bance term vt = (IN − K)ηt can be argued to belong to the observable
information set Ft, and is unpredictable given the information available at
time t− 1 if vt is set to zero. This consideration suggests that if the struc-
tural parametersΥ, ρ,K of the model were known, a simple (weaker) test
of the dynamic risk sharing model might be constructed by regressing ξt
on information variables dated t − 2 (or t − 1) and testing for their joint
significance.
More specifically, consider the standard VAR(q) approximation for the
spread ξt, q being sufficiently large:
ξt = b+
q∑
i=1
Giξt−i + ϕt ; ϕt ∼WN(0 , Λ). (26)
where b is a (N − 1)× 1 constant andGi are (N − 1)× (N − 1) matrices
of parameters. Given the above VAR representation a necessary condition
for the spread to be unpredictable given information available at time t− 2
is that
Gj = 0(N−1),(N−1) , j = 2, ..., p (27)
whereas the additional constraint
G1 = 0(N−1),(N−1) (28)
must hold if the spread is unpredictable given information available at time
t− 1.
In principle, the above zero restrictions can be easily tested in the con-
text of the stationary VAR(q) model for ξt. In practice, however, although
the a priori knowledge on the average intertemporal discount factor ρ is
high and the parameters inΥ can be replaced by their super-consistent es-
timates without affecting the asymptotics, the adjustment matrixK entering
the spread equation is unknown and must be estimated.
The simple regression-based approach of Section 3.2 can be followed.
Indeed by using the definition of ξt and St and imposing the zero restric-
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tions (27), the VAR model (26) reads, after rearranging terms as,
et −Υ∆wt = b+[K+ (ρK)−1 +G1]et−1
+[G1 + ρ
−1IN−1]Υ∆wt−1
+[ρ−1IN−1 −K−G1(ρK)−1]et−2
−ρ−11 G1Υ∆wt−2 + ρ−11 Get−3+ϕt (29)
where we recall that ρ andΥ can be treated as known. The structure of the
above multiple regression model suggests that, abstracting from the mo-
ment from the non-linear (over-identifying) restrictions characterizing the
parametersG1 andK, a test of the necessary condition for the dynamic risk
sharing model (11) to hold can be carried out by regressing et−Υ∆wt over
a constant, et−1, et−2, et−3, Υ∆wt−1 and Υ∆wt−2 and testing whether
the residuals ϕ̂t are generated by an uncorrelated process. If the residuals
of such multiple regressions are ‘well-behaved’ it is possible to proceed by
re-estimating (29) by ML subject to the non-linear restrictions
A1 = K+ (ρK)−1 +Ψ1
A2 = (G1 + ρ−1IN−1)
A3 = ρ−1IN−1 −K−G1(ρK)−1
A4 = −ρ−11 G
A5 = ρ−11 G
where we denoted respectively byA1,A2,A3,A4 andA5 the parameters
associated with the regression.
Estimation simplifies remarkably if ξt is assumed to be unpredictable
given information available at time t− 1, see the discussion in Section 3.2.
Now, in addition to (27) also (28) holds in the VAR (26) and the regression
model (29) collapses to
et −Υ∆wt−ρ−1Υ∆wt−1 = b+[K+ (ρK)−1]et−1 (30)
+[ρ−1IN−1 −K]et−2+ϕt.
and the necessary condition for the spread to be unpredictable is that the
residuals ϕ̂t of the OLS regression of et −Υ∆wt−ρ−1Υ∆wt−1 over a
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constant, et−1 and et−2 are uncorrelated. Moreover, given the equation
above the matrices of parameters B1 and B2 of the multiple regression
et −Υ∆wt−ρ−1Υ∆wt−1 = b+B1et−1 +B2et−2+ϕt (31)
satisfy, under the null (27)-(28)
B1 +B2 = ρ−1(K−1 + IN−1) (32)
B2 = ρ−1IN−1 −K (33)
so thatB1 andB2 are non-linearly restricted with (N−1)2 over-identifying
constraints. The estimation of (31) throughML subject to (32)-(33) delivers
a LR test for the model and, if the over-identifying restrictions are supported
by the data, a consistent estimate ofK.
5 Empirical results
In this Section we apply the proposed international risk sharing model
to a set of ‘core’ European countries that joined the European Monetary
Union (EMU) in 1999. Specifically, some of the major (in terms of pop-
ulation and GDP level) countries are considered, i.e. Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal and Austria; we also included
the U.K. as the most important ‘non-EMU joining’ country of the Euro-
pean Union (EU). As is standard in the risk sharing literature (Sørensen
and Yosha, 1998, Asbrubali and Kim, 2004) we use annual data over a rela-
tively long period from 1963 to 2003 and consider Germany as the ‘leader’
country. Data are collected from several international sources. Data on
private final consumption expenditure at current prices, total population,
and price deflators for final consumption expenditure are taken from Na-
tional Accounts and Eurostat. Nominal exchange rates are constructed by
using conversion rates between Euro and former Euro-zone national cur-
rencies (source: Eurostat). The real exchange rates, rexi/0t , are defined as
rex
i/0
t = ex
i/0
t + p
0
t − pit, where exi/0t is the (logged) nominal exchange
rate between the currency of the i-th country and the DM, p0t is the (logged)
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private consumption deflator of Germany and pit is the (logged) private con-
sumption deflator of country i. After 1999 variations in real exchange rates
are due to relative prices only, except for the U.K..
Some descriptive evidence is reported in Table 1, where for each coun-
try i =France, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Austria and
U.K., and given 0 =Germany, the correlation between real (per capita)
consumption growth (∆cit) relative to Germany (∆c
0
t ) and the correspond-
ing changes of the bilateral real exchange rate (∆ri/0t ), Corr(∆c
i
t −∆c0t ,
∆ri/0t ) are computed. Consistent with other studies, Table 1 presents prima
facie evidence at odds with open economy models with FRS.
The apparent lack of risk sharing among the major European countries
resulting from Table 1 could be explained, in the light of the theoretical ref-
erence equation (1), by observing that each pair of investigated countries
might not share the same relative risk aversion parameters, i.e. θi 6= 1 so
that the actual correlation is between ∆cit− θi∆c0t and ∆ri/0t .10 Another
argument is that the poor correlations of Table 1 can be due to the effect of
non-negligible stochastic terms ηit, which in the light of the model speci-
fied in Section 2 may reflect: the preference shocks of the two countries, or
arguments of the utility function that interact non-separably with consump-
tion but which have not explicitly modelled, e.g. hours worked/leisure,
government spending, real money balances, see e.g. Ravn (2001). Our al-
ternative explanation is that the empirical counterpart of the model (1)-(2)
should be regarded as a long run relation between the variables in levels cit,
c0t and r
i/0
t .
RISK SHARING IN THE LONG RUN. Following the procedure outlined in
Section 4.1 we proceeded by estimating for i=France, Italy, Spain, Nether-
lands, Belgium, Portugal, Austria and U.K., separate VARs of the form
xt = (cit, c
0
t , r
i/0
t )
′ over the 1963-2003 period, with a linear trend in the
deterministic part and restricted to belong to the cointegration space. Al-
though one could reasonably expect the presence of a structural break in
10Moreover, as argued in Section 3, if countries face adjustment costs even the correlation
between∆cit− θi∆c0t and∆ri/0t might be flawed by the omission of the lagged quantities
∆c0t−1,∆r
j/0
t−1, .... and the error-correcting deviations (ct−1 −Υwt−1).
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1991 due to the German unification in all estimated VARs, we did not find
clear evidence in favor of a structural change.
Before estimating the VARs we preliminarily carried out standard unit-
roots tests on the time-series involved; results are reported in Table 2 and
indicate that all variables appear driven by I(1) stochastic trends. This result
suggests that ‘strong form’ PPP, i.e. the stationarity of real exchange rates
can be sharply rejected in our framework. This result also shows that an
additional cointegrating relation given by the trivial linear combination (0,
0, 1)xt should not be expected to hold in xt = (cit, c
0
t , r
i/0
t )
′.
After selecting the optimal number of lags ensuring ‘well-behaved’
VAR residuals, we tested for the number of cointegrating relations and es-
timated, where possible, the relation (3). Results are reported in Table 3
and Table 4. Table 3 summarizes the ‘lambda-max’ and ‘trace’ LR tests
for cointegration rank (Johansen, 1996) and Table 4 the estimated equation
(3) for the country pairs where a theoretically consistent cointegrating re-
lation between cit, c
0
t and r
i/0
t was found.
11 It can be noticed that for the
Netherlands-Germany pair we reported the long run risk sharing equation
(3) even though the tests for cointegration rank did not support its existence;
indeed, differently from the Spain-Germany and UK-Germany pairs, in that
case we obtained, by forcing the cointegration rank to one, a theoretically
consistent (stationary) relation in levels. On the other hand, the cointegra-
tion rank tests shed some doubt on the cointegration rank characterizing the
VAR model for Portugal-Germany; nevertheless, in this case we were not
able to identify any cointegrating relation consistent with the theory.
In summary, from the results of Table 3 and Table 4 it is possible to
identify six ‘core’ EMU countries: Germany, France, Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Austria and to some extent Italy, which seem to share risks, over the
1963-2003 period, consistently with the predictions of the model (1)-(2).
For easy of reference henceforth we shall refer these countries as ‘Group
1’. On the other hand, the two Iberian countries and the U.K. seem to depart
from the implications of the theory. We shall refer to Spain and Portugal as
11We carried out the empirical analysis also over sub-samples. In particular, we devoted
attention to the 1975-2003 and 1987-2003 sub-periods and in both cases we did not find
significant differences with respect to the results reported in the tables that follow.
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‘Group 2’.12
Referring to the countries of Group 1, the estimated relations in Table 4
suggest that German real per capita consumption plays the role of a driving
factor; moreover for these countries we do find a significant role for the real
exchange rate in the risk sharing relations. Except for the Italy-Germany
country pair, all estimated coefficients exhibit signs consistent with the the-
ory and reveal that countries do not have identical attitudes towards risk.
The estimated ratio of the German coefficient relative to country i-th rela-
tive risk aversion coefficient, θi, ranges from 0.57 to 1.31, whereas the es-
timated intertemporal rate of substitution of consumption, δi, ranges from
0.22 to 2.81 (excluding the case of Italy-Germany). The unexpected sign of
the estimated δi in the Italy-Germany VAR model seems to indicate a vio-
lation of concavity in the CRRA utility function, albeit the χ2 test for the
hypothesis δi = 0 leads to a p-value slightly above 0.05. The magnitude
of the estimated δis in the Netherlands-Germany and Belgium-Germany
pairs also points that albeit useful, the assumed CRRA specification for
utility functions can be too restrictive, a common finding in the consump-
tion literature. For all five country-pairs a linear trend enters significantly
the cointegrating relations (see the parameter φi in (3)), highlight valuable
(although small in magnitude) differences between countries intertemporal
discount rates. Moreover, for the five European country-pairs reported in
Table 4 the ηit stochastic terms appearing in the risk sharing relation (2)
can be modelled as a stationary processes; this means that either preference
shocks are stationary, or (less likely) that variables omitted from the utility
function that interact non-separably with consumption are stationary.
By interpreting the results of Table 4 in the spirit of Obstfeld (1989,
1994), Backus and Smith (1993), Canova and Ravn (1996) and Ravn (2001),
it can be concluded that the countries of Group 1 tend to insure risks against
permanent income shocks. These findings contrast with Sørensen and Yosha
(1998) where, using methods that ignore dynamic adjustment, poor risk
sharing is detected in Europe.
On the other hand, the countries of Group 2, including the UK, do not
seem to be part of this process. This evidence, nevertheless, does not rule
12Notice that Spain and Portugal joined the EU only in 1986. Among the countries of
Group 1 Austria joined the EU in 1995.
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out the occurrence of international insurance mechanisms shielding against
short term income fluctuations, an issue which is investigated below.
DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT. Having established that international risk shar-
ing as a long run phenomenon seem to characterize the EMU countries of
Group 1, we investigated the short run dynamic properties of the real per
capita consumptions in the light of the theoretical implications of the model
outlined in Section 3. Recall that the proposed dynamic risk sharing model
implies that adjustments should be interrelated, in the sense that also for-
eign countries’ lagged temporary deviations from FRS are important for
explaining future home consumption changes. One of our primary interests
is to evaluate whether this prediction of the model finds support from the
data.
We start by estimating an unrestricted VECM model for yt = (c′t ,
w′t)′ , ct = (c
fr
t , c
it
t , c
ne
t , c
be
t , c
au
t )
′, wt = (c
ge
t , r
fr
t , r
it
t , r
ne
t , r
be
t , r
au
t )
′ over
the 1963-2003 period with the cointegration equations (22) fixed at the
super-consistent estimates obtained in Table 4. The number of lags of the
VECM is set to 1 (i.e. 2 lags in the corresponding VAR in levels); standard
residual-based specification tests, reported in Table 5, do not show any par-
ticular departure from the model assumptions. Furthermore, the stability of
the model, for fixed cointegration relations, has also been checked through
recursive techniques, showing that the short run parameters appear to be
substantially stable over the considered time span.13
According to (4) the relation between ct − c∗t = ut and disequilibrium
error terms, et = ct − Υwt − φ(t + 1), is given by et = ut+ηt. Thus
the dynamic behavior of the estimated deviations from long run risk shar-
ing of Table 4 summarized in the vector êt = (ê
fr
t , ê
it
t , ê
ne
t , ê
be
t , ê
au
t )
′
provide insights about the process of adjustment. Consider a VAR repre-
sentation for the stationary vector êt; by computing generalized impulse
response functions (Pesaran and Shin, 1996, 1998) it is possible to figure
out not only the speed of adjustment to FRS of each country of Group 1,
but also whether the adjustment to equilibrium is interrelated across coun-
13We did not find clear-cut evidence of the presence of structural breaks in correspon-
dence of the German unification. Indeed, the unification might have lead to an increase of
the amount of risk sharing.
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tries. Figure 1 plots the generalized impulse response functions calculated
with respect to one standard error shock to respectively each equation of
the VAR over an horizon of ten years; the estimated VAR includes one lag
and an unrestricted constant. The graphs support the idea that convergence
is slow in the countries of Group 1 and that temporary deviations from
risk sharing in one of these have remarkable effect in the other countries.
From the generalized impulse response functions it turns out that the av-
erage half-life14 of deviations from FRS due to country specific shocks is
about 3 years. The average half-life of deviations from FRS due to gener-
alized shocks in the other countries is about 3.9 years for France, 4.7 years
for Italy, 2.9 years for Netherlands, 3.4 years for Belgium and 3.9 years for
Austria. This evidence suggests that the dynamics of consumption streams
might be captured by the model sketched in Section 3.
We thus proceeded, along the line summarized in Section 4.1 by inves-
tigating whether the restrictions that the system (14) entails on the short
run parameters of the VECM are consistent with the empirical evidence.
The unrestricted VECM model for yt = (c′t , w′t)′ clearly appears to be
overparametrized. In order to find a suitable reduction of the model, in
Table 6 a number of sets of zero restrictions are tested (through standard
likelihood ratio tests) separately for each equation as well as at the sys-
tem level. In the first row of the table, we test for each equation whether
the lagged first differences of non-country specific variables (with the ex-
ception of the German consumption) can be excluded. Similarly, in the
second row of the table, we test for each equation whether the lagged first
differences of all variables with the exception of the German consumption
and the country-specific real exchange rate can be excluded (recall that, ac-
cording to (14), ∆cjt−1 should not appear among the regressors of the j-th
equation).15 For France, Belgium and Austria, the exclusion restrictions
are not rejected, either with or without lagged home consumption growth
among the regressors. For the Netherlands, the restrictions are not rejected
14The half-life can be defined in this context as the expected number of years for a devi-
ation to FRS to decay by 50%.
15The dynamic adjustment structure obtained in our model under quadratic adjustment
costs is tight: the inclusion of lagged consumption growth might help to catch possible habit
persistence effects (or higher-order adjustment costs) which are implicitly not accounted in
the solution of the model.
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provided that lagged consumption growth appears among the regressors.
Only in the case of Italy the restrictions are strongly rejected, showing that
Italian consumption growth seems to be characterized by a more involved
dynamic structure than the other countries (which may indicate imperfec-
tion in the risk sharing mechanisms at shorter horizons, as documented by
Cavaliere et al., 2005). Turning to the issue of the impact of disequilibrium
terms, i.e. the impact on the short-run consumption dynamics of the de-
viations of actual consumption streams from optimal risk sharing levels, in
Table 6, rows 3 to 5, we test for each country (as well as at the system level)
whether changes to home consumption do not depend (i) on the lagged dis-
equilibria in all countries (row 3), (ii) on the lagged home disequilibrium
(row 4) and (iii) on the lagged foreign disequilibria (row 5). Overall, the
picture is quite clear: consumption changes do depend on past deviations
from the optimal consumption level and cross-adjustment terms seem to be
important for most countries.
Detailed estimates of the VECM model with the exclusion restrictions
tested in Table 6 imposed are reported in Table 7. For France we find
strong adjustment with respect to home past deviations from the optimal
risk sharing position. For the Netherlands, home disequilibrium is partially
significant (the associated p-value is just above 10%), and we also find
evidence of interrelated disequilibrium correction mechanisms. Note that
lagged consumption changes matters, stressing habit persistence phenom-
ena even stronger than those accounted by the adjustment cost structure
implied by the minimization cost problem (7). In the case of Belgium,
we observe a significant effect of the home disequilibrium term; interest-
ingly, we also observe a significant effect of the disequilibrium terms as-
sociated with neighbouring countries. In the case of Austria, only its own
disequilibrium from FRS matters in explaining future home consumption
changes. Finally, as anticipated above, changes to consumption in Italy
display a quite complicate dynamic structure, which tend to be strongly
affected by lagged consumption disequilibrium of most countries. In sum-
mary, these results shows that risk sharing, when present, is not likely to
take place instantaneously; adjustment costs appear a possible explanation
of the observed short run dynamic patterns of consumption.16 In general,
16As previously noticed, a by-product implication is that traditional risk sharing tests
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the presence of cross-adjustment terms in the country specific consump-
tion equations points that idiosyncratic shocks tend to propagate across the
‘core’ European countries engaged in the risk sharing arrangement.
Even though labour mobility can be hardly regarded as a risk shar-
ing channel in Europe (Puhani, 2001) and a permanent tax-transfer system
ruled by a central fiscal institution is far from being fully at work, the above
results show that short run consumption fluctuations of Group 1 countries
appear consistent with a gradual process of adjustment towards the outcome
that would prevail under ‘frictionless’ markets.
An interesting question is whether the Group 2 countries, which are not
found to share risk with the other countries in the long run, are character-
ized by short term movements in their consumption which are similar to
those observed for the Group 1 countries. To this purpose, in Table 8 we
report the estimates of a VAR model for Spain and Portugal, including ex-
ogenous regressors given by the lagged error correcting terms of the Group
1 countries estimated in Table 4. Interestingly, while for the case of Por-
tugal changes in real per capita consumption are found to depend only on
their lagged value, for the case of Spain changes in consumption are cor-
related to contemporaneous changes in German consumption as well as to
the deviations from the optimal FRS consumption levels of all the Group
1 countries. Hence, although failing to share risks in the long run with the
Group 1 countries, Spain (but not Portugal) seems to be characterized by a
marked process of adjustment of consumption which resembles – to some
extent – that predicted by the proposed dynamic risk sharing model. Fi-
nally, as regards the UK we did not find a connection with consumption
growth rates of Group 1 countries and the corresponding bilateral real ex-
change rate changes.
PRESENT VALUE TEST OF DYNAMIC RISK SHARING. According to the
estimates of the VECM reported in Table 7, the zero restrictions (23) im-
plied by the dynamic risk sharing model on the parameters of the estimated
VECM can be rejected. The zero constraints in (23) result in 55 exclusion
restrictions on the system (21) and lead to a LR statistic equal to 126.49.
based on growth rate specifications are usually misspecified in that they overlook the role
of disequilibrium dynamics.
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This result may depend, however, on the assumption of exogeneity of real
exchange rates (and of German consumption), which underlie the deriva-
tion of the restrictions. The results in Table 9 shows that the exogeneity as-
sumption (24) is clearly rejected17, hence making formal tests of the cross-
equation restriction derived in equation (15) unreliable. Hence we focused
on the (testable) further implications of the risk sharing model discussed in
the sections 3.2 and 4.2.
The risk sharing model (11) entails that the spread variable defined in
(25) must be unpredictable given the information observable at time t − 2
or t− 1, depending on the assumptions made on preference shocks. Given
the annual frequency of the data it is reasonable to investigate predictability
of the vector of spreads relative the Group 1 countries with respect to the
information available at time t− 1. This can be done by checking whether
the estimation of the regression model (31) delivers residuals which are not
correlated. In this multiple regression model the vector of deviations of the
observed consumption streams from the optimal FRS positions is defined
as êt = ct − Υ̂wt − φ̂ (t+ 1), where the preference parameters Υ and φ
are fixed at their super-consistent ML estimates of Table 4. The average
intertemporal discount factor ρ can be selected within a given grid.
Table 10 reports standard residual correlation tests associated with the
unrestricted OLS regression of êt−Υ̂∆wt−ρ−1Υ̂∆wt−1 (with ρ fixed at
0.96) over a constant, et−1 and et−2. Residuals should be uncorrelated for
the spread to be unpredictable given information at time t − 1. Although
at the system level the test seems to reject the hypothesis of uncorrelated
residuals, at the single-equation level support for the null can be observed.
Thus in its weakest form, i.e. without explicit reference to the implied non
linear parametric constraints, the risk sharing model (11) appears consistent
with the data. On the other hand, by regressing êt−Υ̂∆wt−ρ−1Υ̂∆wt−1
over a constant, et−1 and et−2 subject to (32)-(33) the (N − 1)2=25 over-
identification restrictions lead to a LR statistic of 126.8.18
17It is worth noting that the result that consumption helps forecasting real exchange rates
confirms the finding in Apte et al. (2004).
18Due to the relatively high order (5 × 5) of the matrices of parameters involved, the
estimation of the model (31) subject to (32)-(33) was simplified by replacing the constraints
in (33) by a first-order Taylor series expansion around a 5 × 5 diagonal matrix; more pre-
cisely, assuming for easy of exposition that ρ ≈ 1, the function f(K) = K−1 + I (see
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6 Final remarks
Risk sharing can be achieved through private markets or central fiscal in-
stitutions. Actual markets, however, are characterized by frictions that im-
pede the instantaneous adjustment to the equilibrium and generate costs to
countries. However, investment barriers, transport costs, tariffs and other
barriers might not be large enough to impede the equalization of ex-post
nominal marginal rate of substitution after a gradual process of adjustment.
This paper formalizes a stylized process of adjustment towards optimal
risk sharing where countries attempt to minimize the costs of deviations
from FRS. The idea is that intertemporal deviations from the first order
conditions of one country may imply dynamic adjustment in all countries
of the risk sharing pool. The resulting dynamic risk sharing equations give
a precise role to expectations on future market developments and generate a
slow and interrelated process of adjustment. One of the main implications is
that positive (negative) shocks affecting one country produce adjustments in
the consumption streams of the other countries belonging to the agreement.
Omitting such kind of dynamics as in e.g. Kollmann (1995) and Canova
and Ravn (1996) or by simply differentiating optimal risk sharing relations
may flaw both tests and measures of the extent of international risk sharing.
Our dynamic risk sharing model is applied to a set of ‘core’ European
countries which joined the EMU in 1999 over forty years span of data;
in the absence of mobility in European labour markets one would expect
integrated capital markets acting as shielding devices against permanent in-
come fluctuations for a single currency to have economic grounds (Eichen-
green, 1993). Our results suggest that once we allow preference parameters
to vary across countries, European consumption streams tend to conform to
the implications of risk sharing as a long run phenomenon and the PPP is
violated. Moreover, our estimates highlight a marked process of adjustment
towards equilibrium which, to some extent, can be attributed to intertem-
poral (dis)utility costs. Therefore the lack of European risk sharing found
(32)) was approximated linearly as f(K) ≈ f(K0) + (−K0)−1(K − K0)(K0)−1, with
K0 containing the diagonal elements of the estimated adjustment coefficients bαc of (21),
see Table 8. Given the statistical rejection of the over-identifying restrictions (32)-(33) we
did not report in Table 10 the estimated (I5 − bK) matrix.
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in previous studies, see e.g. Sørensen and Yosha (1998), can be potentially
explained by the rich dynamic structure underlying European consumption
streams.
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Figure 1: Generalized impulse—response functions computed from the
VAR relative to c onsumption disequilibria t erms bet = (befrt , beitt , benet ,bebet , beaut )0 . 
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